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Abstract: The principles of liberal political theory are often said to be “freestanding.” Are they 
indeed sufficiently detached from the cultural setting where they emerged to be intelligible to people 
with other backgrounds? To answer this question, this essay examines the Indian secularism debate 
and develops a hypothesis on the process whereby liberal principles crystallized in the West and 
spread elsewhere. It argues that the secularization of western political thought has not produced 
independent rational principles, but transformed theological ideas into the “topoi” of a culture. Like 
all topoi, the principles of liberalism depend on other clusters of ideas present in western societies. 
When they migrate to new settings, the absence of these surrounding ideas presents fundamental 
obstacles to the interpretation and elaboration of liberal principles. The case of Indian secularism 
illustrates the cultural limitations of liberal political theory rather than showing its universal 
significance.   
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Advocates of political liberalism claim that its central principles are “freestanding.” That is, liberal 
principles of justice do not depend on any comprehensive metaphysical doctrine, and can therefore 
be endorsed by people from different religions and cultures.1 This goes together with a historical 
account: until about the seventeenth century, western political thought was entangled with Christian 
theology, but then intellectuals realized that religious conflict was here to stay and that politics 
needed to be separated from religious concerns. Modern political philosophy came into being as a 
form of reasoning distinct and independent from political theology.2 To address the problem of 
enduring disagreement about religion, classical liberalism advocated the individual’s freedom to 
choose his convictions and plan his life. However, once liberals discovered that individual autonomy 
was also an object of reasonable disagreement, they concluded that the principles governing political 
life should stand independently from any controversial comprehensive doctrine.3
If liberal principles ought to be freestanding, we should be able to determine whether this is the 
case. This essay raises a simple question: Does liberal political theory remain intelligible to people 
with cultural backgrounds completely different than that of modern westerners? Are liberal principles 
sufficiently freestanding from the cultural and religious setting where they emerged to be accessible 
to reasonable individuals from cultures other than the modern West? Answering this question is 
important to political theorists. First, the claim that political liberalism can be endorsed by people 
from different cultures presupposes that its principles are intelligible to such people. When groups of 
citizens fail to make sense of liberal tenets of justice, we cannot expect them to join any reasonable 
agreement on such tenets. Second, liberal political theory has been exported to non-western societies 
to guide their political institutions and problem-solving. There, the demand that liberal principles be 
freestanding has additional urgency. In case these principles require the support of western 
metaphysical conceptions, they will not function adequately in the absence of those conceptions. 
Third, contemporary western societies are becoming increasingly diverse and include citizens with 
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different cultural experiences. This poses another challenge: if the intelligibility of liberalism depends 
on a particular cultural background, it cannot without difficulty continue to offer a basic political 
model for western democracies.  
To answer our question, we should examine what happens when concepts from liberal 
political theory migrate to different cultural settings. This essay intends to do so by looking at the 
secularism debate in India. First, we reveal some problems in the thesis that the concept of 
secularism has changed in India because of the historical conditions under which it developed. To 
account for these problems, we have to re-examine the process through which liberal principles 
emerged in the West and then spread elsewhere. We present a hypothesis on the dynamic of 
secularization that produced the principles of the liberal secular state. Next, we show its implications 
for the migration of ideas between different cultural settings. By distinguishing between certain 
properties of theories in the natural sciences and political theories, we specify the difficulties caused 
by the cultural migration of the latter. Finally, this generates the prediction that liberal political theory 
will face problems of intelligibility, when it moves to new cultural settings. To assess the value of our 
hypothesis, we then return to the issue of Indian secularism and to the landmark debates that 
occurred when the Constitution of India was drafted.  
Indian Secularism and Conceptual Change 
In the last two decades, the Indian secularism debate has focused on diagnosing the crisis that 
secularism is undergoing because of the rise of Hindu nationalism.4 Some participants conclude that 
causes internal to the secular state are to blame. First, even though the Indian state professes to be 
“secular,” they suggest it has been neither impartial towards nor detached from religion. It has 
regularly intervened in the affairs of some religious communities, while leaving others alone.5 A 
second complaint is that the notion of “secularism” in India is obscure and that it means different 
things to different people.6 Third, some argue that secularism was imposed on a deeply religious 
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Indian population by alienated westernized elites. The idea of secularism may make sense against a 
Christian background, where the relation between “religious authorities” and “secular rulers” has 
long been a central concern, but it is an alien import in India and has failed to take root here. Finally, 
these authors argue that secularism’s marginalization of religion in Indian society has led to a 
backlash and radicalization in the form of Hindu nationalism.7
In response, it is argued that these critics presuppose one normative or “transhistorical” 
model of secularism – an idealized version of the western separation of church and state. Instead, 
this response continues, secularism has “multiple meanings,” and a specifically Indian form of 
secularism has come into being because of the historical conditions under which it emerged.
  
8 
Secularism is a universal doctrine, Rajeev Bhargava asserts, since its basic constituents are constant, 
namely, “a separation of organized religion from organized political power inspired by a specific set 
of values.” But these elements can be interpreted in several ways. Therefore, secularism has no fixed 
content, but “multiple interpretations which change over time.”9 Indian secularism is distinct from 
western secularism, for it was transformed in the process of responding to problems like caste 
discrimination and extreme religious diversity.10
 There is truth to the claim that concepts in political theory change accordingly as they are 
used to conceptualize and solve new problems. James Farr has described conceptual change as an 
“outcome of the process of political actors attempting to solve the problems they encounter as they 
try to understand and change the world around them.” Concepts, he emphasizes, are “never held or 
used in isolation, but in constellations which make up entire schemes or belief systems.” These larger 
schemes or theories are rational attempts to solve problems generated “in or between political 
beliefs, actions, and practices.” Theories may undergo change in the attempt to solve particular 
problems, whenever theorists abandon certain concepts, conceive new ones, or modify the reference 
or criteria of application of some concepts. Such conceptual changes can be wholesale and happen 
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all at once, but “generally they will proceed incrementally, slowly, even glacially, and always against a 
backdrop provided by those concepts which are not at that moment in the process of change.”11
This clarifies some of the conditions under which concepts change. Since they are not held in 
isolation but as larger theoretical schemes, concepts can either change against the background of a 
stable theoretical framework or one such framework can be replaced by another. In the latter case, a 
new theory has to be formulated before the old one can be replaced. Like any theory, it cannot 
consist of a few isolated sentences, but should present a systematic framework. In the former case, 
the framework will put certain limits on the kind of change concepts can undergo, since any 
theoretical scheme should possess minimal coherence to continue to make sense to us.  
  
This point merits amplification in the context of political theory. Normative principles like 
religious freedom or state neutrality should be embedded in some minimally coherent framework. If 
they are not, isolated sentences such as “there ought to be religious freedom” can be interpreted in 
infinitely many ways. In the absence of interpretive limits, we can call on such principles to justify 
many conflicting policies. But one of the functions of liberal political theory is to put constraints on 
the policies legitimate within any liberal democracy. Consider the following analogy: in modern 
democracies, it is not as though any decision is legitimate merely because it is a majority decision; the 
constitutional and legal framework puts limits on the legitimacy of majority decisions.12
Various theories of secularism are permitted and so is flexibility in interpreting these. Yet, 
each interpretation has to abide by the interpretive limits of some background framework or model 
 Normative 
political theory plays a similar role. Principles of religious toleration and state neutrality put 
constraints on state policies towards religious communities: excesses – say, persecuting one religious 
community or extreme privileging of another – are restrained by such principles. To enable them to 
play this role, however, these principles cannot be interpreted as stand-alone sentences. We have to 
respect the interpretive limits laid down by some or another theory of the secular state.  
6 
 
of the secular state. The reason becomes clear when we consider the case of India. Here, the absence 
of interpretive limits has enabled Hindu nationalists to call on the principle of religious freedom to 
implement “anti-conversion” legislation that targets Christians and Muslims (illustratively called 
“Freedom of Religion Acts”).13
What kind of change has the concept of secularism undergone in India? Most authors note 
that “secularism” has acquired new meanings, related to “equal respect for all religions.”
 Similar circumstances would allow us to insist that “secularism” in 
Europe refers to a system where certain religious doctrines are imposed on all citizens, because this 
conceptual change helps solve the problem of, say, the integration of Muslim minorities. Not only 
would this conflict with other valid claims in liberal theories, it would also provide the tools to justify 
illiberal policies as instances of liberal secularism. This is perhaps the most important reason why 
political theories need to strive for consistency, even where some concepts change. If they do not, 
they can no longer limit the type of measures we can justify in their terms.  
14 They leave 
it unclear how this changed notion is connected to other concepts. Does this amount to a new 
connotation to be accommodated within liberal political theory? That does not appear to be the case: 
many argue that Indian secularism deviates from classical liberal principles. Is there then a new 
theory or interpretation of secularism in India? Certain conditions have to be fulfilled before we can 
speak of an “interpretation” here. What is interpreted? If it concerns only one term, then 
interpretation would amount to stipulating some definition for “secularism.” This is equivalent to 
saying that a new interpretation of Darwin’s evolutionary theory could materialize only by defining 
the word “evolution” differently. Any new “interpretation” of secularism cannot interpret only one 
term. It has to interpret a series of terms and sentences, and clarify the semantic and logical relations 
of an entire system of concepts.15 Generally, a principle like “equal respect for all religions” makes 
sense only if it is part of a larger theory, which explains what equality of respect entails, what 
constitutes religion as the object of respect, and how these concepts are related to those of the state, 
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the citizen, equality...16
In a recent article, Bhargava defends “the distinctiveness of Indian secularism.” In western 
secularism, he says, separation of state and religion means either mutual exclusion or neutrality, but 
Indian secularism unpacks the metaphor of separation differently, in terms of “a policy of principled 
distance.” The state does not abstain from intervening in religious affairs, nor does it treat all 
religions symmetrically. Instead, principled distance entails that a state can intervene or not, 
depending on “the context, nature, or current state of relevant religions.” In other words: “To say 
that a state keeps principled distance from religion is to claim that it intervenes or refrains from 
interfering in religion, depending entirely upon whether or not some values are protected or 
advanced. Moreover, it is to admit that a state may interfere in one religion more than in others, 
depending once again on the historical and social condition of all relevant religions.”
 But in the Indian debate, such questions go unanswered. It is as though the 
word “secularism” could stand in isolation and acquire new “meanings.”  
17
First note that this policy of principled distance attributes extraordinary powers of 
observation and cognition to the state. The state should be able to know the context, nature, and 
condition of religions in such a way that it has good reasons to decide where and when to intervene 
in the affairs of these religions. The problem is that we do not currently possess any widely accepted 
intersubjective descriptions of the religions of India that clarify their nature or condition. The policy 
of “principled distance” requires such descriptions. Without them, state officials are free to take 
recourse to those descriptions that justify their intention to intervene in the affairs of some 
community.  
 
Consider Bhargava’s examples. Within the framework of principled distance, he says, when 
the state advances the value of social equality, then it will justifiably interfere more in “caste-ridden 
Hinduism” than in Christianity or Islam. When it aims to advance “a diversity driven religious 
liberty,” then it may intervene more in the latter two religions.18 Several theorists argue today that the 
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dominant descriptions of “Hinduism” are western constructions and products of a generic Christian 
descriptive framework.19 Similarly, the common understanding of “the caste system” is rejected as a 
colonial projection, and the connection between Hinduism and caste has been denied.20 We do not 
have to endorse any position in these debates to recognize that they provide good reasons to distrust 
the standard descriptions of “caste-ridden Hinduism.” The same is true for dominant descriptions of 
Islam.21
Depending as it does on subjective judgments about religions, “principled distance” brings 
back the partisanship into the state’s relation to religious communities that secularism seeks to 
prevent. Bhargava asserts that the state must ensure that the relationship between itself and religions 
is guided by non-sectarian motives consistent with the constitutive values of secularism.
 As a consequence, such descriptions cannot help the Indian state to decide reasonably and 
impartially where to interfere in religious matters.  
22 To 
guarantee this, however, we need something more than some values. It is impossible to ensure that 
the state’s justifications are consistent with any set of values, unless there are constraints on how these 
values can be interpreted. In other words, we require a theory that puts interpretive limits on 
“secularism,” “religious freedom,” and other terms by relating these to each other in systematic 
fashion. Only then can we guarantee that justifications for state policies are consistent with secular 
values. Bhargava explicitly denies this kind of structure to Indian secularism. He views it as a 
“contextual secularism,” which recognizes that it is “a multi-value doctrine,” and that any situation 
demands compromises between its values. This cannot be done by taking recourse to some general 
principle, he says, but “can only be settled case by case and may require a fine balancing of 
competing claims.”23 This is as good as saying that secularism in India does not have any general 
conceptual structure, but allows the state to decide on ad hoc basis which measures to adopt towards 
religious communities, as long as it is able to justify these in terms of some secular “values.”  
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“Principled distance” is not an interpretation of secularism, but an ex post facto justification 
of the behavior of the Indian state since 1947 by making ad hoc modifications to liberal political 
theory. This way of “interpreting” secularism offers the means to legitimize illiberal policies. As one 
author puts it, “since secularism remains a nebulous concept, the ruling party can pursue partisan 
ends and still claim to be upholding secularism.”24 Under these conditions, Hindu nationalists can 
suggest that “Hinduism is secularism in its noblest sense” and that a Hindu state would be a truly 
secular state.25 Or, as another observer notes, Supreme Court judges can draw upon Rawlsian liberal 
arguments “to legitimate the core beliefs of the Hindu right on the most fundamental of all 
questions, the nature of Indian national identity.”26
Attempts to show the distinctiveness of Indian secularism reveal its incoherence. Could the 
problem lie in the demand that thinking should be coherent and consistent? Are these criteria 
perhaps derived from western reasoning? Such suggestions ignore the debates that occurred in India 
over millennia. When Vaidikas, Buddhists, and Jains held disputes about the nature of human action, 
desire, or the self, they pointed to inconsistencies and incoherence in each other’s arguments. The 
same happened in debates between advaita (“non-dualism”) and dvaita (“dualism”) schools of 
Vedanta. Indian thinkers rejected inconsistent reasoning and developed sophisticated systems of 
logic. Consistency and coherence are demands put on human reasoning in Indian culture as much as 
they are in the West.
 This happens when a concept like secularism is 
modified without paying heed to the conceptual framework of which it is part.  
27
Liberalism, Secularization, and Conceptual Migration 
 We should look elsewhere to account for these problems in the Indian 
secularism debate.  
Today, the classical “secularization thesis” and its claim that religion gradually declines in modern 
societies have lost credibility. More and more authors argue that we need to understand the 
emergence of our modern secular age differently.28 In the words of Charles Taylor, “subtraction 
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stories,” which suggest that modern secularity is the residual kernel that remains after discarding the 
impact of religion on human nature, are inadequate.29 Secularism as it developed in the West was 
shaped by the internal dynamics of western Christianity, like its long history of reform movements.30
Given this growing consensus, how should we now conceive of the general relation between 
modern western thought and its religious antecedents, or more specifically, between Christian 
political theology and liberal political theory? Is this relation merely one of origin and influence or is 
there a stronger connection? In other words, what has secularization meant in the realm of ideas, and 
what does this tell us about the status of modern political theory?
  
31
To address these questions, we shall build on a hypothesis about secularization introduced by 
Balagangadhara in his “The Heathen in His Blindness...” (1994). Modern western societies did not 
become free of the influence of religion, he suggests, but instead secularization is a part of the 
expansion of religion. As a religion, Christianity exhibits a double dynamic of universalization: 
proselytization and secularization. The former is how this religion expands directly, through the 
process of recruiting people into its fold, among other things. In doing so, it creates a community of 
believers. “Secularization,” by contrast, also extends the dominance of this religion but in another 
form, through the creation of what looks like a non-religious secular world within the ambits of a 
religious world. In this sense, Christian religion universalizes itself through the two antipodal 
movements of proselytization and secularization.
 
32
Topoi of Liberalism 
 If we confine “secularization” to the realm of 
ideas, our question becomes: Do religious ideas spread across society in a secular guise?  
All cultures and societies have their own commonplaces. We would like to introduce the term 
“topos” to refer to a particular kind of commonplace idea, which plays an important role in the 
conceptual world of a society.33 Not all commonplace ideas are topoi, even though each of them has 
the potential to become one. Whether or not a commonplace becomes a topos depends upon its 
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ability to be elaborated in the form of a theory or hypothesis. Hence we can identify a commonplace 
as a topos only after some thinker develops it into a theory. Alternatively, a commonplace idea can 
become a topos in a different way: by playing the functional role of a heuristic that allows one to 
develop new theories or hypotheses. That is, topoi can give direction to the process of transforming 
other ideas into theories. An important characteristic of topoi is that they exhibit some sort of 
structure or coherence. They are not isolated commonplace ideas but consist of clusters of related 
ideas. This is not to say that, taken together, all topoi form a coherent whole. The relationship 
between clusters of topoi could be one of relevance or irrelevance, compatibility or incompatibility.  
We can now state our hypothesis about the secularization of religious ideas succinctly: some 
ideas developed in the theology of a religion are “secularized,” i.e. spread in an apparently secular or 
non-religious guise in society, in the form of topoi. Secularization in the realm of ideas, then, is the 
process of transforming religious ideas into the topoi of a culture.  
This formulation may generate a thorny problem: after all, what makes some ideas into 
religious ideas? The problem disappears if we restate the thesis. In the realm of ideas, Christian religion 
universalizes itself through a twin process of proselytization and secularization. Proselytization 
consists of articulating some ideas within the framework of a particular theology: embedding and 
elaborating ideas in the contexts of a theology. Secularization takes the form of transforming these 
ideas into topoi and untying ideas from their theological embedding and contexts. In the movement 
of proselytization, the particular ideas of a theology crystallize and spread; in that of secularization, 
these ideas lose some of their theological embedding and particularity, accordingly as they are 
transformed into the topoi of a society.  
Let us illustrate this hypothesis historically. From the start, attempts were made in western 
Christendom to spread theological ideas among the populace. This happened through sermons and 
florilegia: a kind of handbooks for producing sermons, consisting of quotations from the Bible, the 
12 
 
church fathers, respected theologians, and pagan philosophers, indexed and classified in terms of 
topics relevant to the life of the believer. This classification followed fixed levels of theological 
authority. Scripture came first, then certain church fathers and later theologians. Passages from 
classical philosophy could serve only as illustrations of truths already established. Out of this 
tradition grew a new genre of texts and mode of learning: that of the commonplace books. These Latin 
books emerged during the Renaissance and were associated with the educational programme of 
humanism. They dominated European education throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth century. 
Students and scholars kept notebooks divided into headings and sub-headings under which 
exemplary quotations from various sources were brought together and fitted into the broad 
conceptual framework of Christianity. Thus, theological ideas were transmitted in society as 
commonplaces about human existence and its relation to God.34
Commonplace books were particularly popular in the Protestant world, where they played a 
significant role in shaping early modern political thought.
  
35 Here, the formation of the liberal secular 
state comes into the picture. When Protestant intellectuals discussed the question of religious 
toleration, they did so in a conceptual language that was clearly theological, namely, that of the 
theology of Christian liberty.36 This is not to say that the toleration discourse reproduced Luther’s or 
Calvin’s theology. Rather, several claims from these theologies had become commonplaces: the claim 
that human existence was divided into two spheres – the spiritual “kingdom” of the soul and the 
political “kingdom” of temporal physical existence; that the flesh is sinful and needs to be restrained 
by coercive political powers; the belief that God alone could rule over and judge our souls in the 
spiritual kingdom; the freedom of the conscience; the principle that fallible human beings should not 
bind others to their own understanding in religious matters...37
In the next step, political thinkers elaborated these commonplaces into theories of toleration. 
In the process of solving the problem of confessional co-existence, they developed certain 
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theological commonplaces into political theories and transformed them into topoi. In his writings on 
toleration, for instance, John Locke calls upon the theological ideas of Christian liberty and the two 
kingdoms to transform these into a theory about two basic spheres of human existence: that of civil 
interests and that of religion or the pursuit of salvation. His argument for the separation of politics 
and religion secularizes the separation of the two kingdoms in Protestant theology.38
Early modern theories of toleration did not consist only of secularized theological ideas. To 
relate topoi to each other or give additional justifications, thinkers could add non-religious arguments 
or ideas from classical philosophy, not obviously related to Christian political theology. They could 
argue that granting freedom to all religions has a positive impact on economic welfare. While such 
“secular” content of liberal theories increased over the next centuries, the clusters of topoi remained 
their conceptual core, around which the rest was built. For example, John Stuart Mill’s attempt to 
demarcate the sphere of individual liberty from that of political coercion in terms of the so-called 
“harm principle” is another articulation of the topoi of the two kingdoms.
 The magistrate 
can rule only over the sphere of civil interests, since human beings have entered into “the 
commonwealth” merely to protect these. Locke relates this central claim to a series of other topoi, 
with which the topos of the two kingdoms forms a cluster. The success of the resulting theory of 
toleration lies in its capacity to relate several topoi to each other systematically and consistently, and 
thus present these as reasonable ideas.  
39
Nevertheless, we can predict the limits within which such theories developed, because these 
were set by the original theological ideas. Topoi are clusters of theological ideas that have been 
secularized. This implies not only that they are elaborated into new theories, but also that they lose 
 Conceptual change 
occurred through the re-articulation of these topoi in different terms and their development into 
various liberal theories. Like all topoi, they had a variety of potential interpretations and could be 
connected to each other in various creative ways. 
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some of their theological content and embedding in the process. The original theological schemes 
become topoi that can be articulated in various ways; yet, their outer limits or generic structures 
continue to constrain the range of potential interpretations. Thus, theory formation remains within 
certain conceptual limits set by the original theological clusters.  
This has another consequence. If some theological idea becomes a topos, we can only lend 
intelligibility to the resulting theory because of the presence of other topoi and theological ideas 
surrounding it. To give a simple example, we cannot speak of the universal right to freedom of 
conscience, without also assuming that it is in the nature of human beings to have a conscience that 
plays a particular role in moral reasoning.40
Importantly, in the cultural setting where they were commonplace ideas, liberal topoi made 
sense because the conceptual resources required for interpreting them were available. In the early 
modern toleration debates, people knew broadly speaking what “religion” referred to, why it 
deserved a special status and freedom, and needed to be separated from “politics,” or what it meant 
to say that “conscience” ought not to be oppressed. These notions were linked to an implicit 
background system of concepts. Naturally, there were many different positions and discontinuities in 
such debates. But conflicts between different theories and normative positions made sense to the 
participants, precisely because they occurred against this type of implicit background of 
commonplaces. These conceptual resources helped in the creative (re)interpretation of theological 
ideas such that multiple articulations of the clusters of topoi became possible.  
 This intelligibility condition is crucial for the acceptance of 
topoi and the theories constituted by them. Their basic intelligibility depends on the surrounding 
constellations of ideas. The accessibility and acceptance of any such theory, and especially its further 
development, are contingent upon this requirement: other commonplace ideas in the surrounding 
culture should sustain the further interpretation and elaboration of the topoi.  
Cultural Migration of Ideas 
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What happens when such topoi migrate to another culture? All cultures in the world have evolved in 
interaction with other groups and cultures. Especially after western colonialism, it is nonsensical to 
speak about, say, a pure Indian culture, as though we are able to discover what it looked like in its 
Ur-form before it encountered the West. Even though it remains possible to distinguish cultures 
from each other, we are not making some absolute distinction between them.41
One of the interesting aspects of cultural contacts is the migration of ideas from one culture 
to another. Ideas have migrated in multiple ways and forms. It would be foolish to argue that all such 
conceptual migrations are problematic. After all, some of the cognitive success of the natural 
sciences relies on their ability to do so. We could suggest that science emancipated itself from 
religious dogma in modern Europe, but such claims ignore the growing body of work showing that 
the scientific revolution was influenced by deep-seated religious ideas.
 Relative to each other, 
we can speak about cultural differences between cultures, even where we lack complete knowledge of 
the cultures in question.  
42 Consider one powerful 
cluster of ideas that played an extraordinary role in the development of scientific thinking. For 
centuries, researchers held the idea that they were searching for “the laws of Nature,” hidden behind 
the surface phenomena and functioning as their regulator. They also spoke of nature as a book 
requiring deciphering. For even longer, Christians believed that natural phenomena expressed the 
underlying order of God’s will and that – besides the book of revelation – that of nature also 
exhibited God’s purposes. It does not require a great deal of imagination to see that the first 
sentences are translations of the second set. In terms of our terminology, the first cluster of ideas 
secularizes the second, which is clearly theological. The ideas that “laws” function as the hidden 
regulators of natural phenomena and that nature is a book are topoi propelling the formulation of 
multiple scientific theories.  
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Does this mean that such scientific theories are secularizations of Christian theology because 
of their origin in religious ideas? Any positive answer commits the genetic fallacy. Even where 
theological ideas played the role of heuristic devices in the development of scientific theories, the 
resulting theories are not secularizations of these ideas, because it is possible to state these theories 
independently of any theological presuppositions. That is to say, such scientific theories contain their 
own conditions of intelligibility.  
To understand Einstein’s theories in physics, we do not have to endorse his belief that God 
does not play dice. Knowledge of physics and mathematics is all we need. We can state the axioms 
and definitions of his theories completely in a non-theological language (as Einstein did). Similar 
considerations apply to Galileo’s famous dictum that the grand book of the universe “is written in 
the language of Mathematics.”43
Is there a migration of topoi across cultures as well? To appreciate the significance of this 
question, let us focus exclusively on the migration of commonplace political ideas: “Humans are 
born free,” “liberty of conscience,” and similar concepts. Some of these have played central roles in 
society: for instance, the French and American Revolutions were inspired by such “simple” ideas. 
Even though similar notions had been part of Christian thought for centuries, they played a 
revolutionary role only in some historical constellations. Consequently, any explanation of such 
events will have to be historically nuanced. We focus on one of these nuances: for these ideas to 
have the cogency they had and continue to have, they need to be surrounded by other ideas that 
 While this topos played the role of a heuristic, the conditions of 
intelligibility of Galileo’s theory do not require such religious ideas. Given the necessary education, 
any person of average intelligence can understand these theories, precisely because they are stated in 
such a way that all axioms become independent of their source of inspiration. When scientific 
theories migrate across cultures and languages, they are interpreted and understood on their own 
terms, for they carry their conditions of intelligibility with them.  
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support them and make them appear intelligible, plausible, and significant. Or, in terms of our 
argument, these commonplace ideas become powerful only where they are articulated as topoi.  
When topoi migrate across cultures, they do not do so as scientific theories do, since they do 
not carry their intelligibility conditions with them. As said, to understand them “properly” or 
creatively, other clusters of commonplace ideas have to be present in society. These conditions of 
intelligibility also contain the limits of permissible interpretations. If one goes beyond these limits in 
interpreting and articulating the topoi, then they begin to lose their basic clarity and heuristic 
productivity. The permissibility here is both conceptual and linguistic: conceptual in the sense that 
these topoi are productive heuristics of research in so far as they are interpreted within definite 
limits; linguistic because interpretations that stretch beyond these limits threaten to transform these 
ideas into linguistic nonsense.  
In the process of cultural migration, the topoi of one culture are used to interpret and 
“elaborate” topoi of another culture. When this happens, the productivity and heuristic capacity of 
the interpreted topoi are often lost and their coherence disappears. Then we speak of the occurrence 
of a conceptual distortion of these topoi: when a topos of one culture is interpreted using the topoi of another, the 
first topos is conceptually distorted. This distortion occurs because the clusters of ideas related to the 
distorted topos are missing. The background of shared conceptual resources, necessary to interpret 
and elaborate the topos in question, is no longer available. There is no commonplace background 
that puts limits on the interpretations of terms, and that allows one to make sense of conflicting 
positions. Because the topos gets interpreted in a distorted fashion, its heuristic ability is also lost. 
Distortions of Secularism 
Let us test the adequacy of the above hypothesis by turning back to the Indian secularism debate. 
From the beginning, liberal principles were central to this debate. English-language notions of 
“religion,” “religious freedom,” and “toleration” had entered India during the colonial period.44 As 
18 
 
English became the lingua franca of the post-Independence intelligentsia, this conceptual language 
remained central to public debate. So when Indian thinkers discuss secularism, they inevitably draw 
on concepts originating from western political thought.45
The best way to assess the value of our hypothesis is to state some of its predictions about 
such debates. First, problems of understanding and interpretation should come into being in the 
Indian secularism debate, because liberal topoi are detached from their conditions of intelligibility. 
Second, in the interpretation of these topoi, conceptual distortions will occur accordingly as they are 
interpreted in terms of Indian commonplace ideas. The meaning of terms should change, and they 
will be related to each other in unexpected ways. Third, because of these problems, liberal topoi shall 
lose their heuristic productivity. They will prove inadequate to conceptualize the relevant problems 
of Indian society, and fail to generate new theories to solve these problems. Fourth, if liberal 
principles have been interpreted in terms of topoi of Indian culture, then there should be 
systematicity to the resulting conceptual distortion. Generations of intellectuals, independent of each 
other, should exhibit a remarkable consistency in the way they interpret some specific topos from the 
West. Are these predictions true?  
 
The Constituent Assembly Debates 
In the 1940s, the Constituent Assembly held decisive discussions on the question of secularism in 
India, setting the agenda for future debates.46 Since most Assembly members agreed that India 
should become a secular democracy, they reproduced standard formulations of religious freedom 
and the secular state.47 Yet, the trouble in interpreting these formulations surfaced whenever there 
was disagreement about their implications. The most striking instance was the question whether the 
secular state requires a uniform civil code.48
This discussion started when Mohamed Ismail, a Muslim representative, proposed to add the 
following proviso to Article 35, which said that the state would secure for its citizens a uniform civil 
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code throughout the territory of India: “Provided that any group, section or community of people 
shall not be obliged to give up its own personal law in case it has such a law.” Ismail defended his 
proviso: 
Now the right to follow personal law is part of the way of life of those people who are 
following such laws; it is part of their religion and part of their culture. If anything is done 
affecting the personal laws, it will be tantamount to interference with the way of life of those 
people who have been observing these laws for generations and ages. This secular State 
which we are trying to create should not do anything to interfere with the way of life and 
religion of the people.49
Several Muslim representatives agreed that the secular state cannot touch personal laws because it 
ought not to interfere in matters of religion.  
 
When others rejected this proviso as a direct negation of Article 35, the dispute turned to the 
correct interpretation of “the secular state.” Another representative insisted that Indians seemed to 
have “very strange ideas” about the secular state: “People seem to think that under a secular State, 
there must be a common law observed by its citizens in all matters, including matters of their daily 
life, their language, their culture, their personal laws.” This is incorrect, he added, because, in a 
secular state, “citizens belonging to different communities must have the freedom to practice their 
own religion, observe their own life and their personal laws should be applied to them.”50 At the time 
when this debate occurred, the idea that the same set of laws and rights should apply to all citizens, 
irrespective of religious affiliation, was not a “very strange idea” but a central principle of the liberal 
secular state. If the state ought not to interfere with the ways of life of people, then legal uniformity 
would become impossible.51
Indeed, such reasoning led Muslim representatives to rejecting the attempt “to have 
uniformity of law to be imposed upon the whole people” concerning civil matters as “a tyrannous 
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provision which ought not to be tolerated.” In response, the lawyer K. M. Munshi remarked that 
democracies in the West had uniformity of law and they were hardly tyrannies. Munshi also denied 
that personal law was part of religion. The dispute now took the form of disagreement about the 
scope of the term “religion,” where Munshi argued that “religion” should be restricted to spheres 
which legitimately appertain to it and the rest of life must be regulated.52 The state was welcome to 
interfere in the secular affairs of any religion. But, as Ismail retorted, each community also disagreed 
on what was religious and secular: “It is a question of difference of opinion as to what a religion 
should do or should not. People differ and people holding different views on this matter must 
tolerate the other view.”53
What happened here? In terms of our hypothesis, the claim that “the state ought not to 
interfere in religious matters” is one of the topoi of liberalism. When it migrates to the cultural 
setting of India, we perceive typical problems of conceptual migration. To make sense of this claim, 
one requires a minimal set of conceptual resources: some basic circumscription of what religion is 
and of the conditions under which the state can interfere. Instead, Muslim representatives treated 
this principle as an isolated sentence and made use of a commonplace from Islamic theology to 
interpret it – the belief that the Shar’iah has been ordained by Allah, and not by human agency, and 
that humans should never modify it.
  
54
Confronted by this interpretation, secularists in the Assembly failed to draw upon any 
conception of religion clarifying which properties make something religious or secular. They had to 
take recourse to other commonplaces to interpret the same topos. Thus, the chief architect of the 
Constitution and advocate of social reform, B. R. Ambedkar, borrowed the cliché from European 
orientalists that religion in India covers all aspects of life from birth to death: “There is nothing 
which is not religion and if personal law is to be saved, I am sure about it that in social matters we 
 Since religion covered all of God’s revelation, they suggested, 
a secular state cannot interfere in Muslim personal law.  
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will come to a standstill.” He offered an alternative to seeing everything as religion: “There is nothing 
extraordinary in saying that we ought to strive hereafter to limit the definition of religion in such a 
manner that we shall not extend beyond beliefs and such rituals as may be connected with 
ceremonials which are essentially religious.”55
Similar problems came into being, when the Assembly discussed what made a state “secular.” 
One representative added the following explanation to the Constitution: “No person shall have any 
visible sign or mark or name, and no person shall wear any dress whereby his religion may be 
recognised.” In the civilized West, he argued, one cannot recognize a man’s religion by his name or 
dress; in India, the opposite was true. If India was to be a secular state, it should enact a law that did 
away with this diversity: “We should not, being a secular State, be recognised by our dress.”
 Ambedkar’s proposal generated a vicious circle, since 
his definition of “religion” included the term to be defined. Without consensus on what religion was, 
there would also be disagreement on what was essentially religious.  
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Even where one appealed to classical liberal notions, these were subjected to peculiar 
distortion. One representative argued that the separation of church and state was necessary because 
western history had shown that their union brought about bloodshed. Given its diversity, India 
should follow the logic of the secular nation-state: “If a State identifies itself with any particular 
religion, there will be rift within the State. After all, the State represents all the people, who live 
within its territories, and, therefore, it cannot afford to identify itself with the religion of any 
particular section of the population.”
 Under 
this interpretation, creating a secular state implied eradicating all visible religious and ethnic 
differences from society. We could rationalize this as an expression of the nation-building project 
and the need to rid India of “ascriptive identities.” Yet, this connection between secularism and 
national unity cannot render the proposal sensible that the secular state should impose general 
uniformity of dress or name giving.  
57 In the next step, the secular state became less recognizable. 
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The real meaning of the word “religion,” this representative pointed out, is “Dharma” or “the true 
values of religion or of the spirit.” All states need religion to get out of their malaise. Therefore, the 
secular state was one that united politics and religion: “When I say, Sir, that the State shall not establish or 
endow or patronise any particular religion, I mean the formal religions of the World; I do not mean 
religion in the widest and in the deepest sense.”58
Conceptual distortions emerged because liberal topoi were cut loose from their conditions of 
intelligibility and interpreted by means of other topoi present in Indian society. Without going into 
the difficult task of specifying these Indian topoi, it is clear that the equation of “religion” with 
“dharma” brought this representative to a distinction between formal religion and dharma, where the 
latter ought to be united with politics. The problem is that terms like “religion” and “dharma” are not 
semantically equivalent. Many scholars have noted the difficulty of translating “dharma”: some 
suggest “law”; others “ritual action based on transcendentally authoritative texts”; yet others say 
“dharma” can mean “order,” “role,” “duty,” or “ethics.”
 In this way, the secular state became a state that 
should be both separated from and unified with religion.  
59 Few scholars would translate it as 
“religion” today. By translating “religion” as “dharma” – either explicitly or implicitly – several 
problems are generated: the word “religion” has a totally different reference for Indians who map its 
use onto the use of “dharma” in Indian languages; the meaning and reference of “religion” become 
unclear; equivocation is unavoidable. Yet, this type of “translation” was not exceptional. Mahatma 
Gandhi often made similar statements that politics and religion should be united, rather than 
separated, and added that he meant “universal religion” as opposed to specific religions.60
In brief, the Constituent Assembly Debates exemplified the problem of the migration of 
topoi. The relevant principles of the liberal secular state had been detached from the connected 
 In such 
instances, liberal claims about politics and religion were transformed and distorted in terms of topoi 
about dharma. 
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clusters of ideas necessary to interpret and elaborate them. Therefore, different parties could 
interpret these principles as they saw fit. Muslim representatives interpreted them in terms of 
commonplaces from Islamic theology. Secularists entered into tricky discussions about the correct 
definition of “religion” and “the secular.” At one point, Jawaharlal Nehru – India’s first prime 
minister and arch-secularist – grew so exasperated by the discussions on “the secular state” that he 
begged “the gentlemen” who use “this word often to consult some dictionary before they use it.”61
Even though we have selected relevant passages, the same problems recurred in legal and 
political debates in India over the next decades. To interpret laws related to religion, judges took 
upon themselves the task of deciding what religion is, what is secular and essentially religious about 
certain practices, and whether or not Hinduism is a religion. As scholars have noted, the criteria and 
definitions used to settle these issues are fatally flawed.
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Creative Distortions? 
 This is to be expected: the notions of 
religion and the secular deployed in liberal political theory had originally been embedded in a 
surrounding system of conceptual resources. Clusters of secularized theological ideas, now 
commonplace in European societies and their natural language use, allowed people to make sense of 
these terms and principles. Detached from these conditions of intelligibility, ideas of the secular state 
were subject to conceptual distortion in India because they were interpreted in terms of the topoi of 
another culture. 
It should be clear that we are not arguing that liberal concepts moved from a coherent and consistent 
state in the West to incoherence and inconsistency in India. Rather, the migration of liberal topoi to 
India reveals their connection to a specific cultural background of related clusters of ideas. Today, 
many of the theological ideas that support liberal principles are no longer present explicitly in western 
public debate. At the very least, they are not shared by all groups in the increasingly multicultural 
24 
 
western societies. Consequently, the kind of confusion seen in the Indian secularism debate also 
surfaces in western debates on secularism and religious freedom.63
Even though our hypothesis postulates a connection between liberal principles and a cultural 
conceptual reservoir, we do not wish to argue that certain ideas belong to western culture. 
Contributions to human thought that help improve the lives of human beings belong to humanity. 
Political theories emerge as solutions to the practical problems that people face in living together. 
Whatever conceptual resources are used, these will express the problems that people face and the 
structure of their solutions. In this sense, the western experience is of great significance to people 
elsewhere. That is why theories originating in the West migrate across cultures. It is also the case that 
there are no “definitive” solutions in political theory. In the course of negotiations between human 
beings, problems change and the inadequacy of old solutions becomes manifest. As a consequence, 
there is continuous renewal in political theory, including efforts to re-interpret earlier thinkers. 
 
When Indians were struggling to define the relationship between the modern state built by 
the British and the diversity of traditions, peoples, and languages in Indian society, it is no wonder 
that they turned to liberal theories about the secular state. In the course of adopting these ideas, they 
struggled to interpret these in the context of Indian culture and society. They adapted some ideas in 
surprising ways. Now the question emerges: what is wrong with this transformative interpretation of 
ideas, even if it involves conceptual distortion? Can this transformation not indicate the creative 
power of distortion? 
In principle, it is possible that the Indian interpretation of topoi originating in the West leads 
to creative results. Before we can establish this, however, we should recognize the challenges faced 
by the migration of political ideas across cultures. In the case of secularism, let us distinguish clearly 
between two aspects: (a) the nature of the problem; (b) the description of the problem. In Europe, the 
nature of the problem was this: how can people belonging to different conflicting religions live 
25 
 
together peacefully? The way European intellectuals stated this problem appealed to commonplaces 
present in their culture. For instance, to say that enduring disagreement over “religious truth” 
confronted them with the task of determining the proper relation between “secular authorities” and 
“the spiritual realm” is to invoke conceptual distinctions indebted to centuries of Christian 
theological reflection. These theological ideas were transformed into topoi and used to frame the 
problem and formulate solutions. In other words, what migrated to India was not some generic 
description of the problem of diversity, but a particular way of stating the problem and its solution.  
There is no canonical form for the statement of problems in political life; multiple 
possibilities exist to do so. We are arguing that the statement of the problem in terms of western topoi is 
of no great help to India. Take the suggestion that India has suffered from religious strife in much 
the same way as the West, and that it should therefore separate “politics” from “religion.”64
Instead of identifying the nature of the Indian problem and seeking inspiration from western 
attempts to solve similar problems, the framers of the Indian constitution and later intellectuals 
conflated a distorted interpretation of western secularism with the statement of the Indian problem. That is to say, 
they did not study the problems of diversity in Indian society; they merely “reinterpreted” western 
conceptions of liberalism as though such reinterpretations could substitute for a clear statement of 
the Indian problem of diversity. This confusion came into existence because Indian thinkers used 
Indian topoi not to study India and its problems of co-existence but to interpret western topoi 
concerning religious conflict and the liberal state.  
 This 
does not result from analyzing the problem of diversity in India, but merely expresses the 
presupposition that the problem here is a variant of that of Europe. Without having a theory on the 
characteristics of religious conflicts, scholars presuppose that communal conflict in India has the same 
structure as the European Wars of Religion; hence the solution of the liberal secular state should 
work here.  
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In such cases, both the problem statement and the solution get distorted, because they are 
reinterpreted in terms of Indian topoi. This leads either to rigidity or to lack of clarity: either one 
reproduces the western liberal model of the secular state as the norm from which Indian politics 
deviates, or one postulates a particularly Indian model of secularism whose properties remain 
unclear. When Donald Smith published his India as a Secular State in 1963, Marc Galanter 
demonstrated how his ideal of the secular state was simply a projection of the American model “with 
an extra dose of separation.” Smith had presented specific American compromises as the rational 
model from which India deviated.65 More than two decades later, the same issue cropped up again 
when Madan and Nandy pointed out that secularists in India had presupposed as the universal norm 
a political model that happened to work in Christian Europe but whose efficacy in India had not 
been demonstrated. In response, thinkers like Bhargava or Amartya Sen did not build any theory 
about Indian secularism and the problem it seeks to solve but added “modifications” to liberal 
political theory.66
If we want to contribute to the renewal of political theory from an Indian perspective, we 
need to theorize the Indian problem of living together in a different way rather than simply 
modifying western political theories. What stands in the way of doing so is the illusion that there is a 
creative Indian “interpretation” of secularism. Nevertheless, there is a level at which the distortion of 
secularism is of great interest to political theorists, which we can only briefly indicate here. Systematic 
patterns can be identified in the conceptual distortion of liberal principles, where these are 
interpreted in terms of Indian topoi. Different generations of thinkers distort these principles in 
much the same way. For instance, they keep emphasizing “the equality of religions” as the core of 
secularism. Such patterns occur, we suggest, because the Indian topoi reflect systematic reasoning 
 Similarly, advocates of Hindu nationalism gave their own “interpretation” of the 
term “secularism” and presented the result as a uniquely “Hindu secularism.”    
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and attitudes already present in the Indian cultural context, which then shape the way in which 
western liberal topoi are understood.67
As Nandy argues, to renew our reflection on the problem of diversity in India, we should 
learn from local traditions of tolerance and try to understand how these have allowed the co-
existence of communities.
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Conclusion 
 The cultural migration of ideas gives us a unique entry point: we can 
track the structure of Indian attitudes and reasoning regarding human diversity by studying the 
systematic distortions these have caused in the Indian interpretation of liberal principles. This is what 
needs to be done to truly make sense of the phenomenon of “Indian secularism.” Once we can 
characterize such alternative modes of reasoning about human diversity, these may offer conceptual 
resources for the renewal of twenty-first-century political theory.  
About two decades ago, Bhikhu Parekh asked – referring to India – “why a free and lively society 
with a rich tradition of philosophical inquiry has not thrown up much original political theory.”69 
Since then, the budding field of comparative political theory has repeatedly expressed the concern 
that the discipline remains ethnocentric and parochial, because it assumes that western political 
thought is universal and ignores that of other cultures.70
The conceptual language that dominates liberal political theory consists of topoi resulting 
from the secularization of Christian theology. These topoi are dependent on what we have called 
their conditions of intelligibility: they require other clusters of ideas present in western society in 
order to remain coherent and productive in the theorizing of political problems. When liberal 
principles like “the separation of politics and religion” migrate to other cultures, their conditions of 
intelligibility do not travel with them. This causes fundamental obstacles to the interpretation and 
 We hope to have shown that the cultural 
migration of ideas is a problem that has not received sufficient attention in this context.  
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elaboration of such principles. Taking into account these obstacles, it is no wonder that the 
formulation of original political theories remains largely a western affair. 
 We can no longer assume that the fact that ideas like secularism have been invoked in India 
proves their relevance and intelligibility across cultures. The Indian debate reveals something 
different: at least some principles of liberal political theory are not sufficiently freestanding from the 
cultural setting where they emerged to be intelligible and helpful to societies other than the West. In 
that case, the freestanding nature of liberalism becomes an empirical question. Many of its central 
concepts need to be re-examined to find out whether these are topoi, what conditions of 
intelligibility they presuppose, and which problems come into being in the absence of these 
conditions. It is only after this exercise that we shall be able to decide on the viability of liberal 
political theory in the increasingly diverse societies of our globe.  
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